KYARiskKNOW YOUR AGENTBY AGENTRISK

SYSTEMIC AGENT RISK / FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Individually permitted.
Collectively exposed.

KYA Risk (KYARisk) is AgentRisk’s approach to examining systemic agent risk in financial institutions: how autonomous agents’ authority, decisions and shared dependencies combine across a workflow.

What is KYA risk? Know Your Agent explained

Before you give a system more autonomy, examine what its agents can collectively cause.

We examine systemic risk arising from how agents’ decisions, authority and dependencies combine across a financial workflow.

What is systemic risk?

In finance, systemic risk is the possibility that disruption within the financial system interrupts financial services and seriously harms the wider economy.

How this relates to KYA Risk

At AgentRisk, we examine systemic agent risk within a defined financial workflow: how connected agents’ decisions, combined authority and shared dependencies can create collective exposure that individual reviews miss. A workflow-level problem does not automatically constitute financial-system-wide systemic risk.

Read the financial-system definition and explanation — BIS (opens in a new tab)

Removing human approval?Expanding delegated authority?Connecting another autonomous workflow?

SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE REVIEW

One consequential workflow. One autonomy decision.

Bring us a workflow

SYSTEMIC RISK/ AUTONOMOUS AGENTS

Three confirmations.
One circular assumption.

Each agent relies on the next. Together, they turn an assumption into apparent certainty.

THE TRANSACTION$40M repayment

Three agents. One funding decision.

HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATION

Follow each confirmation to the condition underneath it.

03 / 03 SOURCES TRACED

Payment

Settlement agent

Permitted
AGENT-REPORTED STATUSPayment ready
WHAT SUPPORTS IT?

“I can pay if Treasury
provides the funding.
”

DEPENDS ONTreasury
Treasury confirmation received

Treasury

Funding agent

Permitted
AGENT-REPORTED STATUSFunding arranged
WHAT SUPPORTS IT?

“I can fund if Collateral
releases the securities.
”

DEPENDS ONCollateral
Collateral confirmation received

Collateral

Mobilization agent

Permitted
AGENT-REPORTED STATUSCollateral identified
WHAT SUPPORTS IT?

“I can release them if the
payment settles first.
”

DEPENDS ONPayment
Payment expected to settle
THE LOOP IS CLOSED. THE FUNDING IS NOT ESTABLISHED.

The confirmations multiplied. The evidence didn’t.

The payment depends on itself. No independent funding source was verified.

0independent funding
sources established
WHAT CHANGED IN THE EXCHANGE
“Available, if…”“Available”“Confirmed”

The qualification disappeared. The authority to act remained.

Permission checks still pass. They do not establish available funding.

KNOW THE AGENT. QUESTION THE SYSTEM.

Illustrative sequence. No live agents, client data or engine output.

THE QUESTION FOR YOUR INSTITUTION

What sits behind the assurances
your agents act on?

When agents revise a plan together, their new dependencies may sit outside the assumptions of the original approval. Reuse an unsupported clearance across workflows, and one assumption can support many consequential actions.

Examine one autonomous workflow
How this financial example works

A replacement plan creates the loop.

An independent funding source is delayed. The agents propose repaying $40M of existing secured borrowing, releasing the pledged securities, then using those securities to raise replacement funding.

But the replacement funding is also the proposed source for that first repayment. There is no independent bridge funding or approved linked-settlement arrangement in this example.

The missing evidence is specific.

Replacement proceeds are assumed sufficient after applicable terms and haircuts. The issue is whether funding is available at the point it is needed. An unfunded instruction may queue or miss its deadline; conversation cannot create cash or bypass settlement controls.

“Permitted” means configured local authority checks pass. It does not mean every institutional requirement is met. The control comparison is hypothetical and supports the illustrated funding sequence, not overall safety or a verified client result.

A simpler boundary test$8M + $8M + $8M > $20M
THREE LOCAL REVIEWS. ONE SYSTEM.ILLUSTRATIVE · NOT LIVE DATA
Three permitted payments above one institutional exposure Hypothetical example: three agents may each release $8M within a $10M limit. Together their $24M release exceeds an intended $20M aggregate boundary by $4M. Agent A $8M PERMITTED Agent B $8M PERMITTED Agent C $8M PROPOSED WHAT DOES THE REVIEW LEAVE OUT? Shared transaction record TWO JUDGMENTS · ONE SOURCE Error reaches payment
Component checksShared dependency
01 / 03

Every agent has a limit.

Each may release up to $10M. Two have released $8M each; a third proposes a separate batch of the same amount.

THE CONTROL QUESTION

Which control keeps their combined actions inside the approved boundary?
What evidence shows that it works?

Component-level control does not establish system-level control.

Systemic agent risk is the potential for financial or operational harm arising from how autonomous agents’ authority, dependencies and actions combine. The unit of review should match the exposure.

HYPOTHETICAL / THREE DISTINCT PAYMENT BATCHES

Let the control prove its value.

One institution. One release window. A $20M commitment cap. Each separate $8M batch passes a $10M local limit. Amounts represent release commitments—not losses.

BATCH A / LOCAL PASS$8MCommitted
BATCH B / LOCAL PASS$8MCommitted
BATCH C / LOCAL PASS$8MCommitted
COMMITTED IN WINDOW$24M$20M cap · $4M over

LOCAL LIMITS: PASSSYSTEM BOUNDARY: EXCEEDED

All three batches commit. The $24M total exceeds the intended $20M boundary by $4M, although each local limit passes.

Nothing has to fail locally for exposure to exceed the intended system boundary.

The arithmetic is simple.
Establishing the right boundary is harder.

Which actions, authorities, dependencies and controls belong together? What stops a commitment before it exceeds the boundary? What changes when a shared assumption changes?

How AgentRisk examines it

PEER-REVIEWED RESEARCH → METHODOLOGY → ANALYTICAL ENGINE

From interaction
to a defensible decision.

KYARisk’s analytical approach is informed by Guy Burstein’s peer-reviewed research into high-dimensional, interaction-driven systemic risk. Client evidence and control testing connect that foundation to your institution’s decision.

  1. 01 / MAP

    Define the exposure.

    Map the agents, authority and dependencies around one decision. Agree the boundary and accountable owner.

  2. 02 / CHALLENGE

    Examine the interactions.

    Trace assumptions and consequences. Use the analytical engine where its method fits; compare against a credible baseline.

  3. 03 / TEST

    Test the controls.

    Check what interrupts the exposure and whether the evidence is independent. Record conditions, results and unknowns.

  4. 04 / DECIDE

    Support the decision.

    Set out findings, constraints, owners and reassessment triggers. Your institution retains approval and risk acceptance.

WHAT YOU RECEIVE

The evidence underneath.
The decision it supports.

01 / THE ANALYSIS

Boundary Stress Profile

The exposure paths, assumptions, control evidence and unresolved questions within the agreed workflow.

02 / THE DECISION

Autonomy Decision Record

The management decision, its supporting evidence, conditions, accountable owners and triggers for reassessment.

Evidence to proceed, constrain, test further or defer. The institution owns the decision; neither output is a certificate of safety.

See illustrative outputs for the circular-assurance scenario
AGENTRISK / KYARISKILLUSTRATIVE FORMAT · NOT ENGINE OUTPUT

01 / ANALYTICAL + EVIDENTIAL FOUNDATION

Boundary Stress Profile

Boundary
A $40M secured-borrowing repayment. Funding must be independently available before payment clearance.
Scenario
Original funding is delayed. Agents propose refinancing securities that are released only after the repayment.
Analysis / comparator
MODELED Three conditional assurances form a closed dependency. Compare accepting the clearances with preserving conditions and verifying independent funding.
Engine contribution
No engine result is asserted here. In a fitted assessment, attach versioned inputs, supported outputs, assumptions and a credible comparison.
Control evidence
UNKNOWN Whether actual agent clearances preserve conditions, trace their sources and verify funding availability. This illustration does not test an institution’s control.
Residual consequence
Holding a repayment can affect a contractual deadline. Independent funding supports this sequence; it does not establish overall safety.
Version the scope, scenarios, sources, analysis and control evidence.
EVIDENCE INFORMS THE DECISION
AGENTRISK / KYARISKILLUSTRATIVE · NOT A CLIENT RESULT

02 / EXECUTIVE + GOVERNANCE CONCLUSION

Autonomy Decision Record

Decision proposed
Permit agents to revise funding plans and accept peer clearances without a joint human checkpoint.
Illustrative decision
Test further. Retain the existing checkpoint. Establish that conditional assurances cannot become payment clearance without independently available funding, including after autonomous replanning.
Ownership / escalation
Name the business owner of the combined exposure, control operator and independent challenger. Record unresolved evidence and the escalation route.
Decision conditions
Reference the Boundary Stress Profile, agreed test criteria, action owners and remaining settlement implications.
Reassess when
Authority, agents, models, funding sources, settlement timing or assurance dependencies materially change.
A decision record, not a risk score or certificate.
Peer-reviewed research · Guy Burstein · Risks 2026

PEER-REVIEWED RESEARCH → METHODOLOGY → ANALYTICAL ENGINE

Published research.
A foundation for interaction analysis.

Guy Burstein is the researcher behind the systemic-risk methodology that informs KYARisk. His peer-reviewed 2026 article in Risks formalizes a geometric vector framework for high-dimensional interaction modeling.

The study examines how risk factors align, share underlying drivers and amplify through nonlinear interactions. It provides a mathematical basis for examining effects that isolated measurements or simple aggregation can miss.

The connection to systemic agent risk: KYARisk examines the decisions, authority and dependencies that agents combine. The research informs our structured interaction analysis; client evidence and control tests establish what that analysis means for a particular workflow.

FINANCIAL-INSTITUTION RELEVANCE

The paper includes a stylized commercial-real-estate credit and corporate-banking application. It examines how interest-rate and vacancy shocks combine across debt-service, valuation, tenant and refinancing exposures.

FROM PUBLISHED RESEARCH TO A CLIENT DECISION

  1. Peer-reviewed systemic-risk research
  2. Structured interaction analysis
  3. Methodology & analytical engine
  4. Client evidence & control testing
  5. Boundary Stress Profile
  6. Autonomy Decision Record

AgentRisk applies the methodology and engine where they fit the agreed workflow, challenges the results against a credible comparator and connects findings to a decision the institution owns.

The paper provides a research foundation; it does not itself validate KYARisk on autonomous banking agents. Its applications are stylized scenarios, not documented KYARisk client engagements. The working engine is team-confirmed; this page does not present an independently reproduced engine run. KYARisk claims neither predictive certainty nor regulatory certification. Academic affiliations do not imply institutional endorsement.

Review scope and the evidence you can bring

SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE REVIEW / DESIGN-PARTNER ENGAGEMENT

Bring a workflow.
Bring a decision.

We examine what component-level reviews may leave between them: shared dependencies, combined authority, correlated actions and control gaps.

One bounded investigation combines the research-derived method, supported engine analysis, client evidence and controlled testing. The aim is evidence to approve, constrain, test further or defer the next autonomy decision.

Delivered by AgentRisk through KYARisk.

THE SCOPEOne consequential workflow.

One autonomy decision, a defined boundary and an accountable institutional owner.

YOU PROVIDEEvidence of how it operates.

Workflow, authorities, limits, dependencies, control information and available logs. Agree access and testing separately.

YOU RECEIVEAnalysis connected to a decision.

A Boundary Stress Profile and Autonomy Decision Record, with conditions, ownership and reassessment triggers.

WORKS WITH YOUR EXISTING CONTROL STACK

Use the evidence
you already have.

Designed to work with evidence from existing GRC, SIEM, workflow and agent-orchestration environments. The review does not require replacing the institution’s current control stack.

  1. 01 / EXISTING ENTERPRISE SYSTEMSGRC · SIEM · Agent/AI orchestration · Workflow/transaction systems

    Controls, ownership, approvals, logs, permissions, execution paths, transactions, limits and workflow state.

  2. 02 / KYA RISK ANALYSISBoundary · Authority · Dependencies · Interactions · Control evidence

    We structure the relevant system, apply the methodology and analytical engine where appropriate, and challenge whether controls interrupt the path.

  3. 03 / DECISION EVIDENCEBoundary Stress Profile · Autonomy Decision Record

    The outputs return to the institution’s existing governance and approval process.

Start with a short description of your workflow and the change you are considering. Assessment timing follows the evidence, access and testing required; no enterprise transformation program is needed to examine one workflow.

DECISION QUALITY IS THE STANDARD
A useful diagnostic should do more than find issues. It should either change the autonomy decision—or establish why the existing exposure boundary remains defensible.
Other autonomy changes and control questions

WHY NOW / YOUR NEXT AUTONOMY CHANGE

Same permissions.
Different system.
Different exposure.

Removing approvals, expanding permissions or changing shared dependencies can change whether the existing boundary remains defensible.

Choose a situation you recognize. This reveals a control question—not a diagnosis.

We are removing human approval.

What prevents an unacceptable commitment before a person can intervene?

Examine precommitment limits, interruption and the authority already delegated downstream.

Examine this change
We are increasing delegated authority.

Who owns the combined limit, and where is it enforced?

Examine overlapping permissions, concurrent actions and the scope of each limit.

Examine this change
We are connecting another autonomous workflow.

Can one workflow change the state another relies upon?

Examine shared records, downstream commitments and sequential actions—even without direct agent-to-agent communication.

Examine this change
We are changing a shared dependency.

Are the executor and checker still independent if their shared model, source or service is wrong?

Examine correlated judgments, common controls and fallback behavior.

Examine this change
We are unsure where the collective boundary sits.

Who defines its scope, time window and accountable owner?

Start by defining what the institution intends to contain and which evidence would show that containment.

Define a review boundary

WHAT THE INDIVIDUAL REVIEW MAY LEAVE UNSEEN

They don’t have to talk.
They just have to
share something.

An agent’s permissions tell you what it can do. Its relationships help reveal what the system can cause.

The connection can carry the risk. A shared record aligns judgments. A release window combines authority. An approval service connects otherwise separate workflows.

One agent can change the state another consumes. Errors can reach payments or settlement without a direct agent-to-agent message.

Agent Ashared stateAgent B

An indirect path is still a path.

A / SHARED CONTEXT

Two judgments.
One blind spot.

A payment agent and its checker trust the same incorrect record. Their agreement is dependent. An approved payment can still be wrong.

Separate roles do not make evidence independent.

B / ACCUMULATED AUTHORITY

Within every limit.
Beyond the total.

Each release passes its $10M limit. Three $8M actions exceed an intended $20M total. No local malfunction is needed.

Who controls the combined authority?

C / CONTROL CONCENTRATION

A stronger check.
A shared point of failure.

One approval service protects three financial workflows. Its outage blocks unauthorized actions but can delay settlement. Risk is displaced, not simply removed.

Does the fallback preserve control and continuity?

Predefined conceptual examples, not simulations of your institution. Amounts are illustrative. Green marks represent selected component checks, not a declaration of safety.

A RELATED CONTROL TEST / AUTHORITY AFTER STOP

The agent has stopped.
Has its authority?

A stop command may halt new instructions without cancelling accepted work, delegated permissions or downstream commitments.

Containment has to follow the authority, not just the agent.

HYPOTHETICAL PAYMENT QUEUE / NO SHARED CANCELLATION

ORIGINATING AGENTActiveCan issue new instructions
ALREADY ACCEPTED DOWNSTREAM
Instruction 01 $8MInstruction 02 $8M
These instructions have left the agent’s control.
Two accepted instructions remain in the queue.

In this example, stopping the agent does not cancel instructions already accepted by the payment service.

Test the stop: does it reach the queue, delegated access and downstream execution—or only the originating agent?

How findings and uncertainty are reported

EVIDENCE DISCIPLINE

The map is incomplete.
That belongs in the analysis.

We distinguish established facts from inference, modeled outcomes and unknowns.

Confident about what can be examined. Explicit about what the evidence cannot establish.

A research direction, not a prediction engine. We do not certify regulatory compliance.

Known
Supported facts about the workflow, authority and controls, with their sources and scope.
Observed
Behavior seen in a trace or test, under stated conditions. Observation is not proof of every possible outcome.
Hypothesized
A plausible interaction path that still needs evidence or testing.
Modeled
A result conditional on explicit assumptions and a defined system boundary.
Unknown
What we cannot yet establish—including paths, dependencies or behavior outside the available evidence.

FOUR LEGITIMATE RESULTS

A useful review can conclude
that the control holds.

01

Control holds

Evidence supports the tested boundary under stated conditions.

02

Control needs constraint

Proceed only with specified limits, checkpoints or other conditions.

03

Control is insufficient

The identified collective exposure is not adequately contained.

04

Evidence is insufficient

Further evidence or testing is needed for a defensible decision.

AN AUTONOMY DECISION IN THE NEXT 90 DAYS?

Before you give the system
more autonomy,
what would change
your decision?

Briefly describe the workflow or change you have in mind. We’ll respond to help establish whether a Systemic Exposure Review is appropriate.

Start your enquiry Systemic Exposure Review — delivered by AgentRisk. Send your enquiry here on KYARisk.

Bring the decision your institution needs to defend.

Learn more about AgentRisk

Optional: prepare a private conversation brief

SYSTEMIC EXPOSURE REVIEW — DELIVERED BY AGENTRISK

Tell us what is changing.

A sentence is enough to start.

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One provider: AgentRisk. KYARisk is the front door for systemic-agent-risk work.